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 I. Scotland 
Martin Hogg 
A. LEGISLATION 
1. Apologies (Scotland) Act 2016  
1 The Apologies (Scotland) Act 2016 has the simple, focused purpose of provid-
ing that in any civil legal proceedings (with a few specified exceptions1) an 
apology made outside the proceedings (a) is not admissible as evidence of an-
ything relevant to determination of liability in connection with the proceedings 
and (b) cannot be used in any other way to the prejudice of the person who 
made the apology.2 The Act defines an apology as “any statement made by or 
on behalf of a person which indicates that the person is sorry about, or regrets, 
an act, omission or outcome and includes any part of the statement which con-
tains an undertaking to look at the circumstances giving rise to the act, omission 
or outcome with a view to preventing a recurrence”.3 The Act does not have 
retrospective effect.4 
2 The provisions of the Act encompass not only spur-of-the-moment apologies 
issued directly after the occurrence of an accident or injury (such as apologies 
made in the aftermath of road traffic accidents) but also prepared apologies is-
sued by commercial parties (such as those issued by manufacturers of goods 
which have injured customers), healthcare providers, and government bodies. 
The crucial point is that such apologies, which are often welcomed by injured 
parties and can assist in helping such parties to cope with the ongoing effects 
of their injuries, can now be made by the party or parties which caused the 
injury without fear that such an apology may amount to an admission of liabil-
ity. Though some scepticism has been expressed as to whether the passage of 
 
1 These are listed in section 2. They include defamation proceedings: see section 2(1)(d).  
2 See section 1of the Act.  
3 Section 3. 
4 Section 4. 
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the Act will have much practical effect,5 the adoption of the Act is in line with 
similar legislation in other jurisdictions6 and Scottish commentators have gen-
erally welcomed its passage. 
B. CASES 
1. AJ Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board, Court of Session 
(Inner House), 13 January 2016, [2016] CSIH 3, 2016 SC 304, 2016 SLT 
253: No liability in Negligence of Fire Brigade for Extinguished Fire 
which Reignited and Destroyed Building 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
3 The pursuer owned a farmhouse which caught fire. The fire brigade were called 
and attended the incident. The fire was extinguished at about 3 p.m. In the early 
hours of the following morning, the fire reignited and burned down the farm-
house. The pursuer alleged that the fire had restarted as a result of smouldering 
timbers in the roof space of the farmhouse. It raised an action in damages 
against the Fire Board, arguing that the fire brigade owed the pursuer a duty of 
care, and that they had negligently breached this duty: once the fire appeared to 
have been extinguished, the fire brigade should (it was argued) have used a 
thermal imaging camera to locate any remaining questionable areas. It was fur-
ther argued that the firefighters should have maintained a regular check on the 
farmhouse to make sure that the fire had been truly extinguished.  
4 The defenders accepted that they owed a limited duty of care to the public at 
large, but argued that this duty was limited to taking reasonable care that they 
did not make matters worse through their conduct. As the fire service were not 
liable in damages if they failed to attend a fire, it would be unprincipled to sug-
gest that a fire service which attended and sought to extinguish a fire could be 
liable in damages (except where it negligently caused fresh injury).  
5 At first instance, the judge allowed the pursuer a proof before answer (that is, a 
trial of the facts before a debate on the law). The defenders appealed against 
this decision. 
 
5 See, for instance, Douglas S K Maxwell, “The Apologies (Scotland) Act 2016: an innovative 
opportunity in the twenty first century or an unnecessary development?” 2016 Journal of 
Personal Injury Law (JPIL) 79–89, discussed below at paragraph 62. 
6 The various states and territories of Australia, for instance, have legislation relating to the 
legal status of apologies.  
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b) Judgment of the Court 
6 On appeal, the appeal court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action against 
the defenders. The appeal court held that public bodies might be held liable for 
negligence only if they made matters worse or if they had assumed a responsi-
bility to a specific party. The present action was similar to the English conjoined 
cases of Capital and Counties plc v Hampshire County Council.7 In one of those 
joined cases, where a fire reignited after being extinguished, the fire brigade 
were held not to have owed any duty of care to a property owner in respect of 
a failure to ensure that the fire had been properly extinguished.  
7 In support of its decision, the appeal bench cited a number of reasons: (1) the 
fire service, in attending calls, should not be taken to have assumed a responsi-
bility to householders – rather, they are carrying out their statutory functions 
and public duty; (2) public policy considerations mitigated against the imposi-
tion of a duty of care, including the consideration that it might encourage a more 
defensive approach by the fire brigade to the conduct of their business; (3) a 
fire brigade owes a duty to the public at large, not just the individual property 
owner, as fire may spread to other properties; (4) there is no common law duty 
on the fire brigade to attend a fire, and it would therefore be unprincipled to 
create a duty in circumstances where the brigade did so attend a fire; (5) it would 
be unfortunate were the Scottish courts to adopt a different approach to that 
which was well established in English law;8 and (6) the fire brigade had not by 
its omission caused the fire to reignite.9  
c) Commentary 
8 This judgment is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, because the judges 
of the Inner House specifically assert that the Scottish courts ought to follow 
House of Lords and UK Supreme Court judgments10 supportive of the finding 
of no liability in the Capital and Counties case, rather than certain first instance 
(Outer House) Scottish judgments which tend to the opposite view. Lady Paton 
states: 
“It is my opinion that the carefully developed, policy-based, more restrictive 
approach currently approved and adopted by the UK Supreme Court must be 
followed by the Scottish courts (contrary to the views expressed in the Outer 
 
7 [1997] Queen’s Bench (QB) 1004. 
8 For reasons (1) to (5), see judgment of Lady Paton at paras 27–31. 
9 For reason (6), see judgment of Lord Drummond Young at para 64. 
10 Lady Paton mentions Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 
15, [2004] 1 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 1057, and Michael v Chief Constable of South 
Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] 2 WLR 343. 
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House in Duff,11 Gibson v Orr,12 and Burnett,13 but in keeping with a recent 
opinion of Lord McEwan in Mackay v Scottish Fire and Rescue Service14 …”.15  
Her Ladyship specifically singles out the previous first instance decision of 
Burnett for criticism (on a number of points), such that it would now seem un-
safe to rely on this case in future argument before the courts. The present judg-
ment is thus a Scottish affirmation of the cautious and conservative English 
approach to the liability of the fire brigade.  
9 Second, it is noteworthy that the appeal court judges express scepticism with 
the view advanced in Burnett that there is no difference between acts and omis-
sions, pointing out that previous House of Lords judgments have emphasised 
that there is a distinction to be drawn between avoiding causing harm to others 
and failing to prevent harm being caused by some other agent. This view led 
one of the judges, Lord Drummond Young, to treat the question of the fire 
board’s potential liability as  
“one of causation. If loss is caused by the acts of third parties or the forces of 
nature, a public authority such as the board cannot be said to have caused the 
loss”.16  
The soundness of this specific analysis of the decision is questionable. The con-
duct of the fire brigade in this case was undoubtedly one of the causes-in-fact 
of the destruction of the building, albeit not the only one: but for their failure to 
ensure that the fire had not been entirely extinguished, the building would not 
have been destroyed. There may be sound reasons for deciding not to attribute 
liability to this cause-in-fact, but presenting that decision as one of causation is 
to oversimply the matter.  
10 The other reasons advanced by the appeal court offer, in general, a more sound 
analysis for its conclusions, although reason number (4) listed earlier – that 
there is no common law duty on the brigade to attend a fire, and it would there-
fore be unprincipled to create a duty in circumstances where the brigade did so 
attend a fire – also seems somewhat suspect. There are surely many circum-
stances in which a party may have no duty to act but where, if it chooses to do 
so, liability may arise in relation to how it acts. Consider for instance profes-
sionally qualified persons (e.g. lawyers, accountants): such persons are usually 
at liberty to decide whether or not to act for a prospective client in relation to a 
matter, but having decided to act are then under a duty to act with care in the 
conduct of the client’s business. That being so, the logic embodied in reason (4) 
 
11 Duff v Highlands and Islands Fire Board 1995 Scots Law Times (SLT) 1362. 
12 1999 Session Cases (SC) 420. 
13 Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue [2007] CSOH 3, 2007 SLT 61. 
14 [2015] CSOH 55, 2015 SLT 342. 
15 Para 26. 
16 Para 64. 
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seems somewhat suspect. Otherwise, the reasons advanced for the decision 
seem defensible, and it is clear that public policy considerations continue to 
play the significant role in this field of potential liability.  
2. William Tracey Ltd v SP Transmission plc, Court of Session (Outer 
House), 19 January 2016, [2016] CSOH 14, 2016 SLT 678: Liability of 
Statutory Energy Provider for Damages in Respect of Encroachment 
onto Private Land 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
11 The pursuer, William Tracey Ltd, was formerly the tenant and latterly the owner 
of land in Linwood, Paisley. The previous owner of the land had granted to the 
defender, SP Transmission plc (an electricity provider), a voluntary “wayleave” 
(a right granted to another party over land) allowing it to lay electricity cables 
over the land and to support these via a steel lattice tower. When ownership of 
the land was acquired by the pursuer, it refused to grant a new wayleave to the 
defender, and issued a notice of removal (under section 8 of the Electricity Act 
1989) in respect of the cables and tower on its land. Thereafter the defender 
applied to the Scottish Ministers for a “necessary wayleave” under Schedule 4 
of the 1989 Act: such wayleaves may be sought from and granted by the gov-
ernment to statutory providers of electricity if the wayleave is “necessary or 
expedient” for their business, and the grant of such a necessary wayleave does 
not require the consent of the owner of the relevant land. The Scottish Ministers 
consented to the defender’s request and granted the necessary wayleave. 
12 The pursuer subsequently raised an action of damages against the defender, ar-
guing that, for the period between its purchase of the land and the grant of the 
necessary wayleave, the defender had had no right to have its electricity cables 
or tower on the pursuer’s land. It argued that the presence of such equipment 
constituted the delict of encroachment. The defender argued that there had been 
no unlawful encroachment.  
b) Judgment of the Court 
13 The judge (Lord Brodie) held that: (1) in principle, installing and keeping elec-
tricity cables and equipment on the land of another is an actionable encroach-
ment, unless the landowner has consented; (2) however, the purpose of the rel-
evant provisions of the Electricity Act is to provide a comprehensive regime 
dealing with the problem of an electricity line and equipment having been in-
stalled by virtue of a consent which has come to an end or is otherwise ineffec-
tive. In such a case, the Act provides (in Schedule 4) for a “temporary continu-
ation” of a prior voluntary wayleave, and the only action open to an objecting 
landowner is to give a notice of removal of the sort which the pursuer had issued 
6 Martin Hogg 
in this case. In consequence, delictual damages are not available during the pe-
riod of such a temporary continuation, the common law right to these having 
been ousted by the statutory regime; (3) more fundamentally, having regard to 
the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Electricity Act, the 
defender had not committed the delict of encroachment at all. That being the 
case, the judge dismissed the case against the defender. 
c) Commentary 
14 The judgment serves first as a useful reminder that, unless some authority exists 
for the keeping of items of property on another’s land, the delict of encroach-
ment is committed by such an act, and the encroaching party will be liable in 
damages for any losses caused. Although the rights of the landowner to exclu-
sive possession and occupation of land derive from its title to the land, and are 
thus property law rights, the offending act is classed as a delict: “Any perma-
nent or quasi-permanent intrusion by something onto the land which in any way 
impinges on enjoyment of the right of exclusive possession, constitutes the de-
lict of encroachment”.17 In English law, such conduct would be treated as a 
form of private nuisance.  
15 The judgment is of interest for two further reasons. First, in relation to a ques-
tion which courts are regularly required to address in various contexts: to what 
extent does a statutory regime exclude delictual remedies that might otherwise 
be available at common law? In this instance, the court was faced with opposing 
arguments about the extent to which the common law remedies available for 
encroachment had been displaced in circumstances covered by the 1989 Act’s 
regime. Both parties were agreed that, in relation to encroachment by electricity 
cables and related equipment, the common law remedy of an order of removal 
had been replaced by the statutory remedy of giving notice to remove; but they 
were at odds as to whether the common law remedy of damages remained in 
place where a new landowner refused to renew a voluntary wayleave and had 
given such notice to remove. There is a limited remedy under the Act of com-
pensation for landowners in respect of whom a necessary wayleave is granted, 
but, as Lord Brodie recognised, “there can be said to be a lacuna in the absence 
of provision for compensation in respect of the interim period between the giv-
ing of notice and the Scottish Ministers’ decision”.18 Despite this lacuna, his 
Lordship felt that the intention of Parliament appeared to have been to provide 
a comprehensive regime. In such an intended comprehensive regime, therefore, 
there was no place for the common law remedy of damages for encroachment. 
The approach bears some similarity with courts’ decisions in relation to other 
statutory regimes, although in many such other cases no damages are available 
because a possible duty of care owed at common law is held to have been ousted 
by the statutory regime. By contrast, in this case, the duty of care question was 
 
17 Para 21. 
18 Para 31. 
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not at issue because the subject matter related to the nominate delict of en-
croachment and not to negligence.   
16 Second, the court goes further. The judge comments not only on the remedies 
available to those who suffer encroachments in circumstances covered by the 
1989 Act’s regime (these remedies are governed by the statutory regime, not 
the common law), but also on the more fundamental point of whether any wrong 
has been committed at all during the process covered by the statutory scheme. 
Lord Brodie’s view is that what might otherwise be wrongful is legitimated by 
the terms of the Act: until the process triggered by the notice to remove is re-
solved, the statute says that “the licence holder shall not be obliged to comply 
with [the notice to remove]”.19 This provision was held by the court to clothe 
what would otherwise be an unlawful encroachment with lawful authority, the 
result being that there is no encroachment. Given this conclusion, the court’s 
discussion referred to in the previous paragraph about remedies seems to have 
been rather redundant: if no wrong is committed, one hardly needs to discuss 
whether common law remedies can or cannot be activated.  
17 The judgment represents, somewhat ironically, an example of the encroachment 
of statutory law onto the common law delict of encroachment. This statutory 
encroachment is twofold, both in relation to the remedies that would otherwise 
be available at common law, but also (more fundamentally) in relation to legit-
imating conduct and thus preventing it from being wrongful to begin with. 
3. Esso Petroleum Ltd v Scottish Ministers and others, Court of Session 
(Outer House), 21 January 2016, [2016] CSOH 15, 2016 SCLR 539: 
Liability of Owner of Land for Environmental Contamination Caused by 
Contractor Engaged by the Landowner 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
18 The first defenders, the Scottish Government (represented by its Ministers), de-
cided to construct a new section of the M74 motorway near Glasgow. They 
appointed Glasgow City Council as the managing agent for the project. The 
Council engaged the third defender, a joint venture group of companies, as main 
contractors for the project. Part of the motorway site comprised land (called 
“the Albion site”) formerly owned by the second defenders, a company called 
Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd, which land was subsequently acquired by 
the Scottish Government. The land had been previously used for the storage of 
quantities of chemicals. A site report prepared in relation to the Albion site 
identified the risk of contamination to groundwater and surface water as a result 
of the chemicals. During clearance of the Albion site, the presence of further 
hydrocarbon contaminants was detected, and remedial action recommended. A 
 
19 Schedule 4, para 8(2). 
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plan was formulated to funnel groundwater off the site. Unfortunately, this fun-
nelling failed to prevent contamination of a neighbouring area of land owned 
by the pursuers, Esso Petroleum Ltd.  
19 The pursuers raised an action against the various defenders based on nuisance 
and alternatively on their failure to exercise reasonable care. The pursuers ar-
gued that the first defenders were vicariously liable for the conduct of the joint 
venture. They sought (1) decree ordaining the first defenders to prevent any 
further escape of hydrocarbons on to their land; (2) decree ordaining the de-
fenders to carry out and complete works within the Esso site to prevent recur-
rence, remove the contaminants and remediate the damage; and (3) damages 
amounting to around £2,800,000. 
20 At the first hearing, the judge dismissed the case against the former owner of 
the Albion site, Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals. In relation to the remainder of 
the claim, he ordered a preliminary enquiry into three questions. The most  im-
portant of these questions was whether the operations carried out on the Albion 
site were inherently hazardous, and whether therefore the first defenders were 
unable to delegate to another party their duty to prevent harm. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
21 The judge appointed to decide the specified questions (Lord Tyre) made the 
following decision in relation to the question of whether a landowner is subject 
to a non-delegable responsibility for inherently hazardous operations carried 
out on its land. He summarised the law of Scotland on the matter as follows: 
(1) liability of an employer for negligence of or nuisance caused by an inde-
pendent contractor extends to operations carried out on a person's land which 
cause or are likely to cause damage or injury to a neighbouring property; (2) 
however, it is not enough to prove that damage to a neighbour’s land is likely 
to occur if a potentially hazardous operation is performed without taking ade-
quate precautions. Liability arises only where either (a) the operation will or is 
likely to cause damage to the neighbour's land however much care is exercised, 
or (b) it is necessary to take steps in the carrying out of the operation to prevent 
damage to the neighbour's land, and those steps are not taken by the landlord 
either personally or on his instructions; (3) liability cannot be avoided simply 
by giving instructions to an independent contractor; and (4) the reasonableness 
of the steps taken specifically to avoid damage to neighbouring land is to be 
assessed at the time when the operation was undertaken, and not with the ben-
efit of hindsight after damage or injury has occurred.20 On the related legal 
question of whether Scots law renders a contractor liable to a neighbouring 
landowner for damage caused by the negligence of or nuisance created by a 
 
20 Para 23. 
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subcontractor carrying out an inherently hazardous operation, Lord Tyre held 
that it did not.21 
22 On the application of the above law to the facts of the case, the judge held that 
(1) the operations carried out on the Albion site were inherently hazardous, 
given their potential to create a risk to human health; and (2) the first defenders 
were not relieved of potential liability for damage to the pursuer’s land caused 
by negligence or nuisance by virtue of having engaged the third defender as an 
independent contractor and having instructed it to take appropriate and ade-
quate precautionary measures. In the light of these findings, the judge ordered 
representations to be made on the further procedure appropriate for determining 
the outcome of the case.   
c) Commentary 
23 The principal legal question discussed in this judgment raises difficult concep-
tual issues about the extent to which harm caused by certain activities carried 
out on land can be disclaimed by a landowner who has employed another party 
to carry out the activities. Landowners are prima facie responsible for any nui-
sances caused by their land. There is an exception to this rule which holds that 
the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for injury caused to a 
third party by the fault of the contractor,22 however that rule is itself subject to 
an exception (settled in English law) that the landowner cannot escape liability 
in relation to activities which are inherently hazardous.23 The exception from 
the exception has long troubled legal commentators, however: Professor Ati-
yah, for instance, pointed out the difficulty with the concept of something being 
“inherently hazardous”: 
“The truth of the matter is that damage or injury can be caused by the execution 
of practically any work, if it is done without due care, and conversely, that prac-
tically anything can be done without causing injury if sufficient care is taken in 
doing it.”24 
Lord Tyre added the further observation that the activities capable of descrip-
tion as inherently hazardous “appears to be a legal construct without any basis 
in scientific categorisation”.25 Concerns with the concept have led the English 
Court of Appeal to attempt to keep the exception as “narrow as possible”.26 
Lord Tyre purports not to express a general opinion on the issue of “the extent 
 
21 Paras 25–27. 
22  Stephen v Thurso Police Commissioners (1876) 3 R 535. 
23 The exception was borrowed from the English decision of Dalton v Angus (1881) LR 6  
24 P S Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) 332, quoted by Lord Tyre at 
para 16 of his judgment. 
25 Para 17. 
26 Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hesse GmbH [2009] Queen’s Bench 
(QB) 725. 
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to which the exception is recognised in Scots law”, but given that he then goes 
on to refer to “the true meaning of the exception … in circumstances in which 
it applies”,27 it would seem that his judgment can be taken as affirming the 
existence of the exception in Scots law at least to the extent described in the 
four points listed at 21 above.  
24 The obvious difference in the practical effect of the exception between English 
and Scots law is that in Scotland it is clear that proof of nuisance (and not just 
of negligence) requires the demonstration of fault (culpa) on the part of the 
defender: it is not a delict of strict liability.28 This requirement serves to provide 
added protection to Scottish landowners faced with possible liability for the 
undertaking of inherently hazardous activities on their land: they must be shown 
to have been at fault in undertaking the activities or in delegating the activities 
to another party.  
25 On the facts of this case, Lord Tyre’s decision seems the right one. As to the 
law, it would be welcome to see a fresh restatement of the principles by the 
Inner House of the Court of Session.  
4. Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP, United Kingdom Supreme Court, 10 
February 2016, [2016] UKSC 6, 2016 SC (UKSC) 59, [2016] 1 WLR 597: 
Liability of Employer for Injury Sustained by Employee who Slipped on 
Icy Surface while Working 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
26 The facts were as narrated at the previous stage of this litigation, reported in the 
2014 Yearbook:29 Ms Kennedy (the appellant in the appeal) was working for 
Cordia Services (the respondent) as a carer, providing care to elderly and infirm 
persons in their own homes. She and a colleague had visited a terminally ill, 
elderly, housebound person in order to provide her with personal care. The 
weather was freezing and icy, and snow was falling. While walking down a 
path towards the home of the housebound person, the appellant, who was wear-
ing ankle boots made from synthetic waterproof fabric with a flat but ridged 
rubber sole, lost her footing, fell and injured her wrist. She sued her employer, 
alleging that the employer was in breach of its duties towards her under the 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999,30 the Personal 
 
27 Para 23. 
28 See judgment of Lord Tyre, para 24.  
29 [Insert reference to discussion of the case from the 2014 Yearbook]. 
30 Regulation 3(1) of the 1999 Regulations provides that “[e]very employer shall make a 
suitable and sufficient assessment of—(a) the risks to the health and safety of his 
employees to which they are exposed whilst they are at work ... for the purpose of 
identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and 
prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions”. 
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Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992,31 and at common law. The 
judge at first instance, having ordered a proof restricted to the issue of liability, 
found her employer liable to make reparation to Ms Kennedy in respect of her 
injury. The employer appealed against that decision, and this appeal was suc-
cessful before the Inner House of the Court of Session. The Inner House held 
that the evidence of an expert witness who testified on behalf of Ms Kennedy 
was largely in admissible because (i) the judge at first instance had required no 
expertise to assess whether the employer was under a duty to take the suggested 
preventative measures, and (ii) Ms Kennedy had been under no greater risk of 
injury than an ordinary member of the public, so there was no duty to provide 
protective footwear that might have prevented the injury. Ms Kennedy further 
appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court.  
b) Judgment of the Court 
27 The Supreme Court overturned the judgment of the Inner House, and restored 
the finding at first instance of liability on the part of the employer. The justices 
held that the evidence of the expert witness had been admissible, useful exper-
tise having been acquired by those familiar with health and safety issues. They 
further held that the judge at first instance had been entitled to find (i) a breach 
of regulation 3 of the 1999 Regulations, given the likely risk of slipping, the 
absence of consideration of individual protective measures by the employer, 
and the lack of appropriate instructions to employees,32 as well as (ii) a breach 
of the 1992 Regulations, given that, had there been a suitable and sufficient risk 
assessment involving a proper consideration of the risks of slipping and falling, 
this would have identified a number of devices available to reduce that risk, but 
none had been provided.33 As to common law liability, the justices observed 
that the context in which common law employer's liability had to be applied 
had changed and it was now generally recognised that a reasonably prudent 
employer would conduct a risk assessment so it could take reasonable precau-
tions to avoid injury to its employees; the common law duty could include seek-
ing out knowledge of risks which are not in themselves obvious34. 
c) Commentary 
28 The reasoning of the Inner House’s judgment was criticised in the 2014 Year-
book. The Inner House’s view in relation to the 1992 Regulations that “a breach 
of the regulation 3 duty cannot, in a case where it is averred that the failure to 
 
31 Regulation 4(1) of the 1992 Regulations provides that “[e]very employer shall ensure that 
suitable personal protective equipment is provided to his employees who may be exposed 
to a risk to their health or safety while at work except where and to the extent that such 
risk has been adequately controlled by other means which are equally or more effective”. 
32 Paras 90–92. 
33 Paras 98-100. 
34 Paras 109–111. 
12 Martin Hogg 
take a safety precaution caused injury, be said to be the direct cause of that 
injury”35 was shaky, and it is heartening to see the Supreme Court pointing out 
that “where an employee has been injured as a result of being exposed to a risk 
against which she should have been protected by the provision of PPE [personal 
protective equipment], and it is established that she would have used PPE if it 
had been provided, it will normally be reasonable to infer that the failure to 
provide the PPE made a material contribution to the causation of the injury”.36 
The rejection of the Inner House’s supposed requirement that breach of the reg-
ulations be a direct cause, or the sole cause, is a sensible one, and bolsters the 
underlying duty imposed on employers by the regulations.  
29 Another suspect piece of reasoning of the Inner House was its view that the 
1992 Regulations were directed only at “risks at work” (i.e. risk created or in-
creased by the nature of the work), rather than other sorts of risks to which a 
worker might be exposed in the same way as any other member of the public is 
exposed. That reasoning was used by the Inner House to suggest that the risk 
of slipping on an icy surface was not a work-related risk. As was pointed out in 
the 2014 Yearbook, that makes little sense: someone may, for instance, be ex-
posed to risks while driving a motorbike in his free time, but that surely does 
not mean that, if that person drives a motorbike while working, his employer is 
not therefore required, under the Regulation, to provide him with a motorcycle 
helmet, just because the risk of not wearing one is a risk to which the employee 
would also be exposed in his private life. The Supreme Court justices sensibly 
reject the Inner House’s fallacious reasoning, pointing out that the Regulations 
require only that the employee must be exposed to the risk during the time when 
she is at work, that is during the time when she is in the course of her employ-
ment. They do not require that the risk be of a different sort to risks that may 
arise outside the workplace. 
30 The decision of the Supreme Court to overturn the Inner House’s judgment is 
to be welcomed. It reinforces the critical importance to employers of ensuring 
that a thorough workplace risks assessment is carried out in relation to individ-
ual employees, and appropriate action taken to deal with risks identified in such 
an exercise. It also recognises that the field of health and safety is growing in 
significance and that therefore those who have developed expertise in the field 
may attain the status of expert witnesses so far as legal adjudicatory processes 
are concerned.  
 
35 [2014] CSIH 76, para 19.  
36 Para 119. 
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5. NRAM plc v Steel and Bell & Scott LLP, Court of Session (Inner 
House), 19 February 2016, [2016] CSIH 11, 2016 SC 474, 2016 SLT 
285, [2016] PNLR 20: Professional Negligence Claim against Solicitor for 
Negligent Misstatement 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
31 The pursuers, NRAM plc, are commercial lenders. They granted loan facilities 
to Headway Caledonian Limited (“HCL”), a client of the first defender, Ms 
Steel, who was a solicitor. The loan related to HCL’s purchase of four commer-
cial premises, in return for which HCL granted a security over the whole prop-
erty.  In response to a communication by NRAM indicating that they wished to 
discharge the security in relation to a portion of the whole property, Ms Steel 
replied by an email which she indicated had attached to it “discharges for sign-
ing and return as well as the whole loan is being paid off for the estate and I 
have a settlement figure for that”. In reliance on this request, NRAM were mis-
led by Ms Steel into discharging the entire security when it ought to have been 
left in place in relation to two of the units. NRAM argued that this error had 
been induced by Ms Steel’s email, whose contents amounted to a negligent mis-
statement for which she, and the firm by whom she was employed (the second 
defenders), should be held responsible. HCL having gone into liquidation, 
NRAM claimed damages amounting to approximately £458,000 from the de-
fenders. At first instance, the judge held that Ms Steel had owed no duty of care 
to NRAM when she made the erroneous statements because (1) it had not been 
reasonable for them to rely on Ms Steel’s statements without checking their 
accuracy, and (2) Ms Steel could not reasonably have foreseen that they would 
rely on her statements without carrying out such a check.  
b) Judgment of the Court 
32 On appeal, the appeal court (by a 2:1 majority) overturned the judgment at first 
instance, and held that the first defender had assumed a responsibility in delict 
to the pursuers in relation to the statements she had made. It was plainly within 
the reasonable contemplation of a solicitor in the position of Ms Steel that her 
email would be relied on as being accurate and, importantly, that it would cause 
the execution and return of the discharge of security attached to it.37 A reason-
able solicitor would have foreseen reliance on the statements made and accord-
ingly an outcome where the discharges were signed and returned.38 In these 
circumstances, the imposition of a duty of care was fair, just, and reasonable.39 
The appeal court thus affirmed the finding of liability made at first instance as 
well as the award of damages.  
 
37 Per Lady Smith, at para 50.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Per Lady Smith, para 52. 
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c) Commentary 
33 This decision concerns the liability of a solicitor in negligence for pure eco-
nomic loss in respect of statements made to a party which had loaned sums of 
money to the solicitor’s client. Had the lenders been properly legally advised 
by its own solicitors, it is very likely that they would not have made the error 
they did in reliance on the solicitor’s misleading request. However, the lenders 
were not legally represented. The judge at first instance held that the solicitor 
knew (or ought to have known) this, and this finding was affirmed on appeal.40 
Though a solicitor normally only owes a duty of care to his or her own client, 
liability in pure economic loss to persons other than the client can arise: as the 
House of Lords’ judgment in White v Jones41 shows, such liability can arise 
from circumstances which disclose an assumption of responsibility by the so-
licitor to the relevant party.  
34 As Lady Paton rightly points out in her leading judgment, whether such a duty 
arises in a specific case turns very much on the facts of the case (the majority 
and minority judges disagreeing on whether, on the facts, it was reasonable for 
the pursuer to rely on the statements made). A court requires to examine “the 
precise circumstances in which the communication came to be made”42 in order 
to decide whether an assumption of responsibility can be held to have been 
made. The language of assumption of responsibility is not very felicitous, sug-
gesting as it does a form of voluntary obligation when, in reality, what is at 
issue is a decision by a court as to whether liability should be imposed as a 
result of certain conduct.43 Delictual liability is not ultimately a voluntary spe-
cies of obligation (like contract and unilateral promise), so that the language of 
assumption of responsibility masks what is in reality a decision by courts that 
liability ought to be imposed. Nonetheless, this judgment reaffirms the courts’ 
view that such language is thought to be an appropriate way of analysing the 
creation of delictual liability.  
35 There are some interesting remarks about whether, in a case such as this, use of 
the Hedley Byrne44 and White v Jones assumption of responsibility criterion is 
 
40 See judgment of Lady Smith, para 13.  
41 [1995] 2 Appeal Cases (AC) 207.  
42 Per Lady Smith, at para 43.  
43 As Lord Brodie rightly notes in his dissenting judgment, ““assumption of responsibility is 
a concept or conclusion arrived at by consideration of a variety of factors rather than a 
description of anyone’s state of mind” (see Lord Brodie at para 69). Lord Slynn previously 
remarked in Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 at 654: “The 
phrase means simply that the law recognises there is a duty of care. It is not so much that 
responsibility is assumed as that it is recognised or imposed by law”. This observation 
underlines the infelicity of the language used in describing the approach, which is not in 
reality a test but rather an ex post facto conclusion.  
44 Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
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the best approach, whether the Caparo Industries45 tripartite test (applying the 
criteria of (i) foreseeability, (ii) proximity, and (iii) fairness, justice, and rea-
sonableness) is better, or whether an approach based on incremental develop-
ment of categories is more appropriate. That question has excised prior courts, 
as it did for instance the House of Lords in Customs and Excise Commissioners 
v Barclays Bank plc.46 In that case, Lord Bingham remarked that the assumption 
of responsibility test was a “sufficient but not necessary condition of liabil-
ity”,47 Lord Hoffmann that it was “critical to decide whether the defendant ra-
ther than someone else assumed responsibility for the accuracy of the infor-
mation”,48 and Lord Rodger that assumption of responsibility was “the touch-
stone of liability for pure economic loss”,49 that it had “very real value” as a 
“criterion of liability” in many cases, and that it “may be decisive in many sit-
uations”.50 These somewhat differing perspectives are all noted in the judgment 
of Lady Paton in this case, who offers no decisive view of whether one approach 
is more appropriate than the others. She confines herself to echoing Lord 
Rodger’s view that there is “real value” in the assumption of responsibility ap-
proach, and her own judgment employs both that test and the Caparo tripartite 
approach, the application of each test affirming the conclusion of the other of 
liability in the circumstances of this case. However, as argued above, the lan-
guage of assumption of responsibility is misleading, and masks the underlying 
nature of a court’s enquiry; the language of the Caparo test at least has the merit 
of expressly stating what it is that the court has to consider when applying the 
test.  
36 A detailed dissenting judgment was given by one of the appeal court judges, 
Lord Brodie, who believed that there were no grounds for disturbing the judge 
at first instance’s finding that it was not reasonable for the pursuer to rely on 
the representation. Given this dissent, it was likely that a further appeal would 
be launched; it was, leave to appeal to the UK Supreme Court having been 
granted on 8 November 2016.  
 
45 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.  
46 [2007] 1 AC 181. 
47 Per Lord Bingham, at para 4. 
48 Per Lord Hoffmann, at para 35. 
49 Per lord Rodger, at para 49. 
50 Per Lord Rodger, at para 52. 
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6. Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy Ltd, Court of Session (Inner House), 20 
July 2016, [2016] CSIH 57, 2016 SLT 781: Product liability – Whether 
Supplier of Electric Golf Trolley Liable for Damage to Building in Fire 
Caused by defective Trolley 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
37 The pursuers were a golf club who operated from club premises in Renfrew. 
The defenders were suppliers of electric motorised golf trolleys, which they 
imported from China and then branded with their own label. One of the pursu-
ers’ members had purchased one of these trolleys, which after use he had left at 
the entrance to the changing rooms in the clubhouse. In the early hours of the 
following day, a fire occurred at the clubhouse, causing approximately 
£500,000 of damage. The pursuers alleged that the fire was caused by wear and 
tear to the unprotected cabling in the trolley, which in exposing the wiring had 
caused a short circuit which led to the fire. The pursuer claimed that this 
amounted to a product defect present at the point of supply, as the design did 
not include adequate protection against electrical faults.  
38 The pursuer claimed (1) that the defenders were in breach of a common law 
duty of care owed to them by the defenders, and (2) that the defenders were 
liable under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (which provides for strict lia-
bility in respect of defective products). The defenders claimed that no duty of 
care was owed at common law, and that statutory liability was excluded by 
virtue of section 5(3) of the 1987 Act, which provided that  
“A person shall not be liable … for any loss or damage to any property which, 
at the time it is lost or damaged, is not —  
(a) of a description of property ordinarily intended for private use, occupation 
or consumption; and  
(b) intended by the person suffering the loss or damage mainly for his own pri-
vate use, occupation or consumption.” 
The defenders argued that the clubhouse was not property ordinarily intended 
for “private use”.  
39 At first instance, the judge held (1) that there was insufficient proximity be-
tween the parties to found a duty of care at common law, and that it was not 
fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty, and (2) that a clubhouse which 
was used by over 700 members and by others was not property “ordinarily in-
tended for private use”. He therefore held the defenders not to be liable under 
the 1987 Act for the damage caused. 
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b) Judgment of the Court 
40 On appeal, the appeal court affirmed the decision at first instance. As regards 
the common law duty of care, there was no proximity between a supplier of a 
golf trolley and the owner of a clubhouse in which the trolley happened to be, 
three years after the supply, and over which the supplier had no control.51 
Whether or not its location at a clubhouse was foreseeable, it might foreseeably 
have been placed in any number of locations, to each of which it might cause 
indeterminate damage were it to catch fire. Furthermore, given the regime of 
the 1987 Act, and the fact that a contract of sale had governed the purchase of 
the trolley, there was little room for the common law of delict to be extended to 
a new situation such as the present, where the legislature had declined to act.52  
41 As regards the case under the product liability regime of the 1987 Act, the club-
house was not property ordinarily intended for private use: the underlying idea 
behind this regime was that, whereas there should be liability for damage to 
property used in a person’s private life, notably, but not exclusively, in a do-
mestic setting and whether that person was a consumer of the product or not, 
that liability should not extend to property used by what might loosely be de-
scribed as economic entities (whether private or not). The pursuers were an 
economic operation, albeit that they were a “private club”. For these reasons, 
the case under the 1987 Act was irrelevant. 
c) Commentary 
42 The judgment is of interest for two principal reasons. First, it provides useful 
illumination of the idea of damaged property having a “private use” so far as 
liability under the 1987 Act is concerned. Second, it offers some interesting 
observations on the continuing availability of common law, Donoghue v Ste-
venson,53 delictual liability for defective products in an era where the statutory 
liability of the 1987 Act exists, and on possible claims at common law in respect 
of physical damage caused by a defective product to a party not in a proximate 
relationship with the supplier of the product.     
43 As regards the meaning of “private use” property under section 5(3) of the 1987 
Act, the court in considering what meaning should be attributed to this idea 
looked at the underlying intention of the EU product liability directive upon 
which the 1987 Act is based. The court considered that this background sug-
gests that what is important is whether or not the property is used for individ-
ual/family/small group of friends’ use as opposed to communal use, based upon 
financial considerations, by a large number of members of the public. The con-
 
51 Para 33.  
52 Para 34. 
53 1932 SC(HL) 31.  
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cern thus seems to be both with the size of the group which might use the prop-
erty as well as the relationship of that group to the owner. That might well pro-
duce a sensible answer in most cases, but one wonders what would view would 
be taken if the two considerations came into conflict, i.e. what if only one per-
son at a time used the property but such persons had no personal connection to 
the owner (but used the property in return for payment)? The answer, one sus-
pects, would be that such use would also not be “private use”, the presence of 
a hire charge being determinative of a commercial rather than a private use. In 
any event, the approach taken by the appeal bench to this question seems a ro-
bust and sensible one. 
44 The second interesting issue is the extent to which use can be made of common 
law liability for defective products in cases where (i) a contract for the purchase 
of the product existed between consumer and supplier and (ii) liability might 
conceivably exist under the 1987 Act if the necessary requirements for such 
liability are fulfilled. The 1987 Act does not purport to replace the common 
law, Donoghue v Stevenson liability for defective products, so in theory a claim 
might be made under either form of liability. Nor does the presence of a contract 
necessarily exclude the possibility of delictual liability. The appeal court bench 
however cites the prior comment of Lord Rodger that  
“Where the position of the parties is regulated … by a mixture of contract and 
statute prima facie there is little room for the common law of delict to impose 
a duty of care…”54 
 
in order to suggest that the combined presence of such features mitigates against 
the creation of a duty of care at common law, adding that “it would no doubt be 
difficult for the defenders to obtain limitless product liability insurance, 
whereas the pursuers … could have insured the premises with reasonable 
ease”.55 
 
45 The decision of the appeal bench negating a common law duty of care is worthy 
of analysis. The focus of the bench on the question of the proximity of the pur-
suers and defenders is noteworthy: traditionally, in cases involving personal 
injury or damage to property, courts have not stressed proximity as a separate 
requirement, inferring it from foreseeability of harm (and in this case the type 
 
54 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council 2009 SC(HL) 21 at para 51.  
55 Para 34. No other mention is made of insurance arrangements in the judgment, and it might 
therefore be assumed from a reading of this judgment that no buildings insurance policy 
was in place over the clubhouse, which would be a curious want of prudence on the part 
of the club were that so. The judgment at first instance ([2015] CSOH 173), however, 
reveals that counsel for the pursuers made reference in his oral pleadings to the pursuer’s 
insurers and the recovery of their costs, which suggests the opposite, i.e. that there was a 
policy of insurance in place over the building: see para 15 of the first instance judgment.  
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of harm and the mechanism by which it was caused appear to have been rea-
sonably foreseeable). But this was not a classic case of harm caused to a con-
sumer of products: the damage in this case was caused to the premises in which 
the consumer had left the product, owned by a different party. The concern ap-
pears to have been that the claim was being made by a peripheral party, one 
who fell within an indeterminate class of potential claimants.  
46 The court noted that there was scant prior authority dealing with a similar sort 
of case: the court mentions only two mid-twentieth century cases that were cited 
to it.56  The court states that these two cases cannot be used as a springboard for 
extending liability of suppliers of defective products for damage caused to prop-
erty “anywhere that the product might have been left by third parties”.57 How-
ever, the first of these two cases (Stennett v Hancock & Peters) bears some 
resemblance to the facts of this case, in that a repairer of a motor vehicle was 
held liable to a member of the public when the repaired part came loose and 
struck the member of the public. Liability was founded on Donoghue v Steven-
son, and the judge did not trouble himself with the worry that anyone might 
conceivably have been injured by the defective repair (compare the concern of 
the appeal bench in this case that the injury might be caused to any number of 
premises). Stennett has been founded on in subsequent cases,58 so it cannot be 
dismissed as an isolated authority or as a novel case. Given this, it can be argued 
that the dismissal by the appeal court of a common law claim on the basis that 
a finding of liability would amount to a “substantial increase in existing known 
fields of liability”59 seems questionable. The court’s dismissal of common law 
duty thus seems somewhat peremptory.  
7. Taylor v Quigley and others, Court of Session (Outer House), 21 
December 2016, [2016] CSOH 178: Liability of Committee of Golf Club 
for Injuries Sustained by a Member on the Club Premises 
a) Brief Summary of the Facts 
47 The pursuer, who was a member of the Colville Park Golf Club, sustained se-
rious injuries to his leg when he stepped on a manhole cover between the club-
house and the first tee, falling partly into the manhole. The pursuer raised an 
action of damages against eight named members of the Executive Committee 
of the golf club (the first to eighth defenders) and Tata Steel (UK) Ltd (the ninth 
 
56 Stennett v Hancock & Peters [1939] 2 All ER 578 and Farrugia v Great Western Railway 
[1947] 2 All ER 565. 
57 Para 32. 
58 Including Robinson v Department of Environment [1989] Northern Ireland Law Reports 
(NI) 372; Audrey Power v Bedford Motor Co Ltd [1959] IR (Irish Reports) 359; 
Herschthal v Stewart & Aldern Ltd [1939] 4 All ER 123. 
59 Para 33. 
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defender), who owned the land in question and had appointed the second de-
fender (the club secretary). The defenders challenged the relevancy of the ac-
tion, claiming that the eight committee members could not be liable to the pur-
suer in a personal capacity and that the case against the ninth defender was 
irrelevant. 
b) Judgment of the Court 
48 The judge (Lord Uist) held that (1) the pursuer could not sue any of the first 
eight defenders in their capacity as members of the club or of its Executive 
Board. There was a rule against members of a club suing each other for injury 
allegedly arising in the course of membership, since there was no distinction 
between the members and the pursuer would in effect be suing himself, but this 
rule did not afford a defence if a duty of care had arisen independently of mem-
bership;60 (2) On the face of it the pursuer was suing the first to eighth defenders 
as members of the club: if they had not been members of the Executive Board 
they would not have been sued. In order to plead a relevant case, therefore, he 
had to make sufficient averments that they owed him a duty of care inde-
pendently of their membership; (3) As the pursuer had failed to aver any rele-
vant basis for such an independent duty of care, his case against the first eight 
defenders was irrelevant and had to be dismissed; (4) As regards the ninth de-
fender, they were sued only on the basis that they were vicariously liable for 
the acts and omissions of the club secretary. As the club secretary owed no duty 
of care to the pursuer, it followed that the ninth defenders could not be held 
vicariously liable for his acts or omissions.  A principal could not be liable to a 
third party for the negligence of his agent if the agent owed no duty to that third 
party. The case against the ninth defender was therefore also dismissed.  
c) Commentary 
49 This is the second noteworthy case of 2016 to involve golf clubs. In this judg-
ment, the matter of interest relates to the liability of committee members of 
unincorporated associations to fellow members of their club. Unincorporated 
associations (golf clubs often fall into this legal category) have no separate legal 
personality: they are merely the collection of individual members who at any 
one time make up the membership of the association. This judgment reaffirms 
the view that club members cannot sue committee members of the club in their 
representative capacity, because that capacity means that they represent all of 
the members, including the member who wishes to sue. The logic of this is that 
a member who wished to sue the committee would, in effect, be trying to sue 
him or herself, which is not permitted.  
50 The exception to this basic rule relates to cases where, in the words of Charles-
worth & Percy on Negligence (quoted by the judge): 
 
60 Para 34. 
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“a duty of care has arisen independently of membership. So, the court can look 
to the circumstances, including the terms upon which a club officer or other 
servant or agent of the club has been appointed, or the club rules, to see whether 
some responsibility has been conferred upon that individual which caused a 
duty of care to arise.”61  
 
The result is that, in some cases, courts have been willing to consider committee 
members liable in delict/tort where a specific duty has been delegated to such 
member(s). So, in Grice v The Stourport Tennis, Hockey and Squash Club,62 
the Court of Appeal thought that a possible reading of the Club rules was that 
responsibility had been delegated to the committee to maintain the premises 
and that this might give rise to a duty of care owed to individual members.63 It 
therefore permitted the plaintiff to add the relevant committee members as de-
fendants in the action. This approach did not assist Mr Taylor in the present 
case because the judge thought that there was no evidence of any such delegated 
responsibility sufficient to support a duty of care owed to individual members. 
  
51 Given the judge’s assessment of the factual position of the committee members 
in relation to individual club members, the decision seems a correct application 
of the law. However, there is the more fundamental question of whether the law 
needs to be changed. The current legal rules leave members of unincorporated 
associations exposed to the hazard of injury without recourse in delict to any 
party owing a duty of care in respect of such injury. In 2009, the Scottish Law 
Commission made recommendations (thus far unimplemented in law reform) 
that not-for-profit unincorporated associations which have more than two mem-
bers and a written constitution should have separate legal personality.64 Had 
those recommendations been implemented, Mr Taylor’s negligence claim 
might have been successful.  
8. Personal Injury 
52 As in previous years, there continues to be a steady stream of personal injury 
claims coming before the Scottish courts. A good number of these concern road 
traffic accidents, medical negligence, and the liability of employers for injuries 
caused to employees.  
 
61 13th edition (2014), at paras 3-52–3-53. Quoted by the judge at para 4 of his judgment. 
62 [1997] EWCA Civ 1139. 
63 See judgment of Otton LJ. 
64 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Unincorporated Associations (Scot Law Com No 
217, 2009), recommendations 1–3. 
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53 Since Scots law was changed in the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) 
(Scotland) Act 2009 to allow claims to be made in respect of presently symp-
tomless pleural plaques, there have been a few reported cases each year dealing 
with the evaluation of claims for that medical condition. So, for instance, in 
2016, one may note the case of Harris v Advocate General for Scotland,65 in 
which the court considered the proper method of calculation of damages for 
pleural plaques giving rise to an increased risk of developing mesothelioma and 
lung cancer. 
54 In relation to road traffic accidents, one interesting reported case is that of Rob-
inson v Scottish Borders Council,66 in which a roads authority was sued in re-
spect of metal strips placed on a road some years previously which caused a 
cyclist to fall off his bicycle and injure himself. In finding for the cyclist, the 
judge rejected the view expressed in oral evidence made on behalf of the Coun-
cil that, because the metal strips were designed into the bridge when it had been 
widened in 1990, no further thought required to be given to them. The judge’s 
rejection of this view is a reminder that the mere fact that a defect in a road 
surface is a design fault rather than one caused by failure properly to maintain 
the road surface does not mean that the continued presence of the defect is not 
negligent. 
55 There continue to be cases dealing with the lamentable topic of historic child 
abuse. One such case was DK v The Marist Brothers [2016] CSOH 54. In this 
case, because the alleged events took place before the provisions of the Pre-
scription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 were amended to exclude the op-
eration of long negative prescription (a twenty year period) to personal injury 
claims, the judge held that the claim of the pursuer had prescribed. A lot of such 
claims relate to facts occurring after the Act was amended (in 1984), meaning 
that claimants have a better chance of recovery. However, even in such post-
1984 cases, the claim is still subject to a triennial limitation period, albeit that 
this can be waived by a court if it “seems to [the court] equitable” to do this. 
The limitation is typically not waived in cases where a long time has passed and 
witnesses have died or else may have very poor memories of the facts, as this 
is often thought to be prejudicial to a fair trial of the facts. That approach how-
ever is likely to be amended in the near future: the Scottish Parliament currently 
has before it the Limitation (Childhood Abuse)(Scotland) Bill. If adopted, this 
Bill will remove the triennial limitation period in respect of personal injury 
claims in cases where the person who sustained the injuries was a child on the 
date the act or omission to which the injuries were attributable occurred, and 
the act or omission to which the injuries were attributable constitutes abuse of 
the person who sustained the injuries. So, in future years, reports of many of 
these cases may tell a different story.  
 
65 [2016] CSOH 49, 2016 SLT 572. 
66 [2016] CSOH 47, 2016 SLT 435. 
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67 See paragraphs 3–10 above. 
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3. Eleanor Russell, “Revisiting the liability of fire services”, Scots law 
Times, 2016, (News) 99–111 
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commenting that it is a “welcome and unanimous statement concerning the di-
rection of the law in relation to the liability of fire services. Any doubt that the 
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significant Lord Drummond Young’s view that policy and proximity cannot be 
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ative exercise.  
4. Mat Campbell, “Somerville v Harsco Infrastructure Ltd: transferred 
intent and the scope of vicarious liability”, Edinburgh Law Review, 2016, 
211–216 
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vicariously liable for jocular conduct of one of its employees which had injured 
another employee. The author analyses recent Scottish decisions, at various lev-
els of the courts, which have considered the role to be played by the “close 
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62 In this article, the author considers whether the Apologies (Scotland) Act 2016 
(discussed above at paragraphs 1–2) is a welcome development in Scots law. 
The author is sceptical of the benefit that the passage of the Act may bring, 
commenting that: 
“The intention of the Act should be commended but serious concerns remain 
about its ability to make any difference to claimants and whether it will have 
any real effect on the number of cases brought in Scotland. The Act suffers 
from its inherently abstract nature and the limited number of detailed studies 
undertaken in Scotland and internationally on whether apologies can actually 
 
68 At 110. 
69 2015 Green’s Weekly Digest (GWD) 38-607.  
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be an effective vehicle for resolving disputes. Taken as a whole, it remains un-
likely that the Act will bring any real benefit to Scotland.”70 
 
The author cautions the English legal system to be wary about too quickly fol-
lowing in Scotland’s footsteps, suggesting that it would be sensible to observe 
how matters develop in Scotland. 
 
70 At 89. 
